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Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally
Funded Subprime Higher Education
Jean Braucher∗
Abstract
The for-profit higher education sector, primarily funded by
federal student aid dollars, produces both the highest debts and
defaults and lowest completion rates for its students. In response,
the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) has promulgated the
Gainful Employment Rule to require for-profit colleges and
universities to meet either repayment or debt-to-income
benchmarks to remain eligible to receive federal Higher Education
Act funding. This Article describes the business model of the
career colleges and their rapid growth over the last decade, the
history of proprietary school regulation, the limited remedies for
overindebtedness of former students, and the tests imposed by the
DOE rule. Although weakened after a massive lobbying effort, the
Gainful Employment Rule as promulgated still promises to put
some of the worst performing for-profit programs out of the
business of operating on a federal dole. This Article compares the
bubbles in for-profit higher education and subprime mortgages,
both of which involved federal encouragement of high risk-taking
to achieve the American Dream. It concludes by questioning the
federal policy of relying on for-profit schools to meet national
higher education goals.

∗ Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona. Earlier
versions of this article were presented at the Washington and Lee Law Review
Symposium on Regulation in the Fringe Economy in Lexington, Va., in October
2011 and at the meetings of the Law and Society Association in San Francisco
and the International Association for Consumer Law at Brunel University in
London, both in June 2011. Thanks to participants in those meetings for
comments and a particular thanks to the law review students at Washington
and Lee University School of Law for their exemplary attention to detail in
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I. Introduction
For-profit colleges have expanded rapidly in the last decade,
using primarily federal student grant and loan funds for their
revenue.1 As will be detailed here, these schools, also known as
1. See infra Part II.D (discussing for-profit colleges’ disproportionate
reliance on federal funds). Not included in the analysis of this Article are forprofit institutions that do not receive federal student aid and thus do not report
under these programs. See Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Claudia Goldin, Does
Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New Evidence on For-Profit Colleges, NBER
Working Paper No. 17827 (2012), available at http://www.nber.org/
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career or proprietary colleges, produce on average significantly
higher debt burdens and default rates for former students than
other sectors of higher education, indicating many of the forprofit colleges do not achieve their mission of preparing students
for “gainful employment.”2 Because so many former students of
these institutions will not be able to repay, it is appropriate to
classify for-profit higher education as involving fringe credit.3
Even though much of the credit is in the form of federal student
loans with reasonable interest rates,4 the label “subprime higher
education” accurately captures the nature of the risk to
individual students. Some students in addition take out private
loans to go to for-profit colleges, further upping the risk of
default.5 Furthermore, the demographic profiles of those taking
papers/w17827 (in a study based on data from agencies in five states, Florida,
Michigan, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, estimating that exclusion from
federal data of for-profit schools not participating in federal student aid
programs may result in understatement by half of the number of for-profit
postsecondary schools and by about 37% of enrollment in the for-profit sector).
This Article focuses on the for-profit schools that rely on revenue from federal
student aid programs and the resulting overindebtedness, so not too much is
lost by not including in the analysis new data from five states about schools that
are mostly non-degree granting vocational programs and thus not part of the
federal drive to attain universal higher education. See infra note 223 and
accompanying text. At any rate these data were made public too late to be
taken into account here.
2. See infra Parts II.E, III.B (discussing high dropout and loan default
rates at for-profit colleges, and discussing the Gainful Employment Rule).
3. See infra Part II.E (discussing difficulty in loan repayment experienced
by former students of for-profit schools).
4. COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 15 (2011) [hereinafter TRENDS
IN STUDENT AID 2011] (reporting interest rates on various federal loans ranging
from 3.4% to 6.8% in 2011–2012). There have been huge changes in the mix of
higher education loans in recent years: as of July 1, 2010, the federal
government stopped guaranteeing educational loans made by private lenders in
favor of providing direct federal student loans. Id. at 8–9. Also, the private
student loan market shrank dramatically after the financial crisis of 2008, from
$22.1 billion in 2007–2008 to $6 billion in 2010–2011. See id. at 4, 10.
5. See Project on Student Debt, PRIVATE LOANS: FACTS AND TRENDS 1 (July
2011) (reporting that 42% of for-profit students used private loans in 2007–2008,
up from 12% in 2003–2004, and compared to 25% of students at private
nonprofit four-year schools in 2007–2008, 14% of students at public four-year
schools, and 4% of students at public two-year schools), available at
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/private_loan_facts_trends.pdf. Although
private student loans have dropped sharply since 2007–2008, students who use
them pay higher interest rates than on federal loans; furthermore, for-profit
schools have responded to the decline in the private student loan supply by
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out student loans to go to for-profit schools—disproportionately
poor, minority, single parents, and military personnel—are
similar to the targets of other fringe credit providers, such as
payday lenders and the purveyors of subprime mortgages
involved in the mortgage crisis.6 The limited academic
preparation of many career college students contributes to the
high-stakes gamble of taking on large educational debt.7
making loans themselves. See TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 9,
13; see also infra Part II.D (explaining that schools cannot receive more than
90% of their revenue from federal higher education aid programs, so making
loans to their own students is a way to comply with this federal restriction).
6. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,616,
43,654 (proposed July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Gainful Employment
Rule Analysis] (discussing argument of the for-profit industry that their high
default rates are due to enrolling different types of students, particularly lowincome students, and rejecting it on the basis that the industry’s own
assessment found that differences in student characteristics accounted for only
about half of the difference in defaults) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668); id. at
43,655 (discussing responsibility of institutions to recruit and enroll students
who can succeed at their institutions and quoting a blog post of Judge Richard
Posner comparing aggressive marketing of for-profit colleges to vulnerable lowincome persons lacking in financial sophistication to the marketing of mortgage
loans during the housing bubble); see also Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief ¶ 21, Career Coll. Ass’n v. Duncan, Docket No. 1:11-cv01314 (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.apscu.org/iMISPublic/
Content/ContentFolders/WhatsHot/GainfulEmploymentComplaint-07202011StampedCopy.pdf (emphasizing that career colleges serve “nontraditional
students” and giving these statistics about their students: “76% live
independently without parental support, 63% are over 24 years old, 54% delayed
postsecondary education after high school, 45% have parents who did not go to
school beyond high school, 47% have dependent children, 40% are minorities,
and 31% are single parents”); Steven Eisman, Subprime Goes to College,
Presentation at the Ira Sohn Conference (May 26, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/32066986/Steve-Eisman-Ira-Sohn-Conference-May-2010
(comparing the bubble in subprime mortgages with the growth in the for-profit
college sector); Steven Eisman, Subprime Goes To College, Testimony Before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, (June 24,
2010), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Eisman.pdf; MAMIE
LYNCH ET AL., THE EDUCATION TRUST, SUBPRIME OPPORTUNITY: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Nov. 2010) available at
http://www.educacion2020.cl/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_down
load&gid=141&Itemid=55 (discussing poor results for minority and low-income
students who attend for-profit institutions).
7. See Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note 6, ¶¶ 6–7 (arguing that the DOE’s Gainful Employment Rule, 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.7 (2011), targets “the quality of a school’s enrollees” rather than the
quality of its programs and creates “massive disincentives” to serving “lowincome, minority, and other traditionally underserved student populations” who
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Lately there is much discussion of whether higher education
in general is “worth it.”8 The answer is likely to be no for much of
subprime higher education, as will be detailed below. Under a
principle of “worst things first,” for-profit colleges deserve
regulatory and enforcement attention. That other higher
education could benefit from reform, too, is not grounds for
ignoring the need for targeted regulation of for-profit colleges.9 At
are “the most at risk” of not meeting new regulatory tests based on repayment
and debt-to-income ratios); infra Part III.B (discussing the tests under the new
Gainful Employment Rule).
8. See e.g., Pew Research Center, Is College Worth It?: College Presidents,
Public Assess Value, Quality and Mission of Higher Education, SOCIAL &
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, May 16, 2011, available at http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/files/2011/05/higher-ed-report.pdf (presenting evidence that, despite
growing dissatisfaction with the price, both rates of employment and incomes
increase with a college education, as well as health, happiness, rates of
marriage, sense of personal intellectual development and other forms of
personal satisfaction, and prospects of graduates’ children). The dissatisfaction
with the price is in part a matter of decreased public subsidy, particularly for
public universities. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the recent decline in
subsidies resulting from state budget crunches). Concerning the difference
between the sticker price and the price paid in different sectors of higher
education, for-profit higher education has a higher net price than public
university education and much of private nonprofit higher education. Price,
however, must be distinguished from cost; the cost of for-profit education is
relatively low, compared to prime higher education, which involves significant
public and philanthropic support. See id. (discussing the fact that despite the
high price to students, the production cost of education at for-profit schools is
relatively low).
9. There is a great deal of variation within the various sectors of higher
education, whether for-profit, public, or private nonprofit. See Amanda Harmon
Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to For-Profit Colleges and
Universities: Business Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges, and Consumer
Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505, 506–07
(2009) (discussing variations in form and success within the for-profit sector);
see also Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,654
(discussing variations in default-completion ratios within sectors); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: STRONGER
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE
STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 18–19 (2009) (noting that some
proprietary schools have low loan default rates). Nonetheless, targeted
regulation of the for-profit sector based on loan repayment and debt-to-income
ratios can be justified in light of these schools’ different missions. The Pew
Report discusses the difference in the missions of the schools through the lens of
what their presidents’ say about them: “Seven-in-ten heads of four-year public
and private colleges emphasize intellectual and personal growth, while about
two-thirds of the heads of two-year and for-profit colleges emphasize career
preparation.” Pew Research Center, supra note 8, at 15. Career preparation is
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a minimum, that regulation should put the worst performers out
of the business of living on federal funds, which is what the U.S.
Department of Education (DOE) plans to do under its new
Gainful Employment Rule,10 scheduled to go into effect July 1,
2012.11 This rule will not eliminate the waste of taxpayer dollars
or the human pain to former students caused by this industry,12
but it is a start. In addition, it is worth noting that the growing
problem of student loan overindebtedness generally, in the public
and nonprofit sectors as well as in the for-profit sector, has been
underexplored in the legal literature. Many more legal scholars
could profitably turn to critical analysis of the student-loan debt
problem in its multiple manifestations, particularly the need for
preventative regulation as well as after-the-fact remedies.13 This
Article is a first effort to analyze the current state of regulation of
career colleges’ eligibility for federal student aid funds.
While students’ risk in the pursuit of subprime higher
education has become reasonably well-known through media
coverage,14 it is not necessarily so well understood that there is a
not easy to measure, but it is simple compared to measuring intellectual and
personal growth. See Creola Johnson, Credentialism and the Proliferation of
Fake Degrees: The Employer Pretends to Need a Degree: The Employee Pretends
to Have One, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 288–93 (2006) (discussing the
instrumentalism that can overtake loftier goals; as a result the goal of career
colleges may not be anything more than providing a credential, a goal that may
be shared by student and institutional provider alike).
10. Gainful Employment in a Recognized Occupation, 34 C.F.R. § 668.7
(2011) [hereinafter Gainful Employment Rule].
11. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34386, 34387 (June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Gainful Employment Rule
Analysis] (explaining that the regulation aims to “protect students by removing
eligibility [for federal loans] from the worst performing programs that fail the
minimum requirements”) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668).
12. See infra notes 168, 190 and accompanying text (concerning
consequences to former students who default on student loans).
13. Some excellent work has been done on the need for debt relief for
former students and the lack of a compelling justification for treating them
worse than debtors on other types of credit. See e.g., John A.E. Pottow, The
Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The
Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 245, 266, 276 (2006) (arguing that “there
are no compelling empirical data to buttress the myth that students defraud
creditors any more than other debtors” and advocating “the adoption of an
income-contingent model of debt repayment” that would dry up the market for
“sub-prime schools [that] target a financially vulnerable client base”).
14. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in
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federal policy of fostering career colleges using student aid funds.
This is not just a de facto policy resulting from the considerable
talent of the for-profit sector in sucking up federal student aid
dollars. Rather, the policy is by federal design. For example, after
noting a recent tripling in for-profit college enrollment, DOE
stated in July of 2010 “[t]his trend is promising and supports
President Obama’s goal of leading the world in the percentage of
college graduates by 2020. The President’s goal cannot be
achieved without a healthy and productive higher education forprofit sector.”15
Regulation of for-profit colleges has been very light, and a
planned step-up in federal oversight under the Gainful
Employment Rule—assuming it is not blocked as a result of an
industry lawsuit16—will still be weak, as DOE concedes.17 The
Past Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A14 (noting that for-profit colleges
have led the way in recent default rate increases and that although they
enrolled about 10% of the nation’s undergraduates, they accounted for almost
half the defaults); Melissa Korn, For-Profit Schools Increasingly Find the Party
Is Over, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2011, at B1 (discussing student resistance to debt
and risk).
15. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,617,
43,641. President Obama has frequently decried the nation’s decline in the rate
of college education compared to other nations. See, e.g., President Barack
Obama, Speech at the University of Texas at Austin (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/09/remarks-president-highereducation-and-economy-university-texas-austin (lamenting decline in one
generation from first place to twelfth). See also infra note 219 (concerning U.S.
rate of college graduation in relation to other nations). While DOE claims to
have a policy of supporting for-profit education, this could be seen as making the
best of a congressional mandate to provide federal student aid to this sector. See
infra note 113 and accompanying text (concerning proprietary schools becoming
eligible to receive federal student aid funds in 1972); infra Part IV.B
(questioning reliance on for-profit higher education to meet national education
goals).
16. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
6, ¶¶ 1–13 (seeking, inter alia, to enjoin enforcement of the Gainful Employment
Rule).
17. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43,657 (concerning the history of “barest minimum enforcement” of statutory
requirement that for-profit colleges prepare students for gainful employment in
a recognized occupation; colleges have been required to check a box so stating);
id at 43,620 (in proposed regulation, targeting schools at which “it becomes
unambiguous that a program’s debt levels are excessive”). That proposed
regulation was later watered down. See Gainful Employment Rule Analysis,
supra note 11, at 34,393–95 (June 13, 2011) (lowering required repayment rates
for eligibility to 35%) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668); infra Part III.B.
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rule focuses on students’ ability to repay their student loans and
thus avoids direct quality regulation, which is difficult at best,18
and at any rate not authorized by the Higher Education Act.19
This Article questions the federal policy of relying on career
colleges to increase the level of higher education in the
population. It also seeks to highlight the irony of setting low
performance standards for the for-profit schools while providing
insufficient debt relief for the substantial numbers of their former
students who do not benefit from the education and who end up
with unmanageable federal and private student loans and lack of
access to a bankruptcy discharge.20 If career colleges cannot be
expected to reduce their default rates to the levels of other sectors
of higher education, their former students should not be hounded
to the grave for repayment. In its Gainful Employment Rule, set
to go into effect July 1, 2012, DOE takes the position that high
levels of federal student loan default are tolerable; the rule allows
schools to remain eligible to receive federal student aid funds if
18. See Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The
Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation,
65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 732–36 (2005) (discussing difficulty of regulation to
ensure quality under conditions of asymmetric information, in which the seller
understands quality better than the consumer); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: EXPERIENCES OF UNDERCOVER
STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED COLLEGES 2 (2011) (stating
that undercover investigators who attempted to enroll in 15 for-profit colleges,
including the largest five, were able to enroll in twelve with fictitious high
school graduation credentials and that at six of these colleges, instructors gave
credit for plagiarized, unresponsive, or incorrect assignments).
19. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2006) (depriving DOE of any authority over
curricula or administration of institutions of higher education); see also GAO-09600, supra note 9, at 8 (noting that under the Higher Education Act, DOE does
not determine the quality of higher education, which is left to accrediting
agencies). Accrediting agencies, however, are not necessarily regulating quality
of the for-profit schools well. See TOM HARKIN, CHAIRMAN, S. COMM. ON HEALTH,
EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, EMERGING RISK?: AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH,
SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT HIGHER
EDUCATION 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter HARKIN, EMERGING RISK?] (noting the
practice of for-profit schools buying small regionally accredited schools and
expanding dramatically, in particular into virtual education, under the same
accreditation). Higher education accreditation should be examined by legal
scholars; a detailed critique of its operations is beyond the scope of this Article.
20. See infra Part III.C (discussing the lack of sufficient debt relief for
student loans, particularly in bankruptcy); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8),
1328(a)(2) (2006) (excepting educational loans from the bankruptcy discharge
absent “undue hardship”).
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they maintain repayment rates of only 35% over three out of four
years, meaning the rest of the former students are not repaying
any principal.21 The agency does so despite explicitly recognizing
the high risk for any individual student.22 If federal policy is to
continue promoting this personal risk-taking, it is time for
Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to return to the
approach of making student-loan debt dischargeable, perhaps
with a delay after leaving school.23
This Article describes the business model of for-profit colleges
in Part II. In Part III, it explains the federal government’s role in
promoting them and also situates the current government
position in the sweep of federal policy concerning for-profit higher
education and student loans over the last half century. Finally,
Part IV compares and contrasts the boom in subprime higher
education to that in subprime mortgages. The dollar volume of
loans for subprime higher education does not approach that of
subprime mortgages,24 but the human cost of both credit
complexes is high.25 There are many other similarities. These
include, as already mentioned, high risk of default and the
demographics of the borrowers. Also striking is how both types of
loan have been promoted as a way to achieve the American
Dream;26 yet the dream too often has proven unattainable.27 The
21. See Gainful Employment Rule, supra note 10; infra Part III.B
(discussing the Gainful Employment Rule).
22. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43,622 (noting “while higher education generally brings higher earnings, there
is no guarantee for the individual”).
23. See infra Part III.C.
24. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1192 Mortgage Debt Outstanding by
Type of Property and Holder: 1990–2010 (2012), http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1192.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (showing
that total U.S. mortgage debt outstanding is about ten times total student-loan
debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See infra notes 168, 190, 211.
26. LYNCH ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
27. See id. (noting that homeownership is “the cornerstone of the American
Dream”). Lynch states that:
[t]he developing showdown between for-profit colleges and the
government is another example of how the aspirations of the
underserved and the unfulfilled promise of the American Dream
combine with lax regulation to make the rich, richer and the poor,
poorer.
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Article ends by advocating stronger regulation that puts more
nonperforming for-profit institutions out of the business of living
on a federal dole, as DOE plans to do but not as aggressively as it
should.28
The subprime higher education bubble appears to be
deflating as the industry hunkers down to ride out a long period
of economic doldrums.29 Student loan defaults in this sector have
spiked,30 but this is not the industry’s prime problem now. When
borrowers default on federal student loans, the colleges typically
already have the money;31 the bailout is prepackaged. The
current problem for the industry is declining enrollments and
thus a decline in new revenue.32 The word is getting out about the
poor results of many career colleges and, at least for a time, fewer
people are being suckered into a bad bet (and the colleges appear
to be deliberately reducing recruitment to avoid enforcement
actions and more aggressive regulation in the short term).33 But
many former students still have to cope with the consequences of
unmanageable debt. They gambled on the dream of a better life
by getting a college education and ended up worse off, too often
with huge nondischargeable debts and no improvement in job
prospects. Beyond that, there is the question whether it is wise
policy to try to achieve national educational goals by funneling
federal dollars into for-profit institutions that specialize in
evading regulation. Cutbacks in federal funds flowing to these
institutions may be the simplest route to reform. Stronger
regulation is needed to prevent a resurgence of the for-profit
sector as the economy recovers.
28. Infra Parts III.B, IV, and V.
29. See infra Part II.G (discussing recent declining enrollment at for-profit
colleges).
30. See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (reporting that from the
2008 to the 2009 fiscal year, the cohort default rate for for-profit schools
increased from 11.6% to 15%); infra Part II.E (discussing higher default rates
and lower graduation rates at for-profit colleges).
31. Federal student aid funds are disbursed while students are in school.
Often 100% of the funds have been disbursed by the time the student has
completed 60% of the semester, even if the student subsequently withdraws. 34
C.F.R. § 668.22(e)(2)(ii) (2011).
32. See infra Part II.G (discussing recent declining enrollment at for-profit
colleges).
33. Infra Part II.G.
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II. The Business Model of For-Profit Colleges
For-profit colleges built their business model on rapid
growth,34 fueled by aggressive recruiting35 and high use of federal
student aid (both grants and loans) to pay high tuition and fees.36
This model has produced large student debt burdens and high
defaults.37 The defaults are symptomatic of an underlying
pathology: although the mission of career colleges is to improve
employability and earnings, placement in good jobs has not lived
up to recruiters’ claims.38
A. Enrollment Growth
As noted at the outset, enrollment in the for-profit higher
education sector rose rapidly in the last decade: from the fall of
2000 to the fall of 2009, full-time enrollment in degree-granting,
for-profit schools grew from 366,000 to 1.5 million, an increase
from 4% to 11% of full-time college students.39 When part-time
students are also included, the growth was from 3% to 9% of all
college students.40 Indeed, headcounts of both full-time and parttime students show that the number of individuals involved is
much larger than the number of full-time students or full-time
34. See infra Part II.A (discussing enrollment growth at for-profit colleges
over the last decade).
35. See infra Part II.B (discussing aggressive and misleading recruitment
tactics used by for-profit school).
36. See infra Part II.C, D (discussing high net prices of for-profit colleges
and their disproportionate reliance on federal funds).
37. See infra Part II.E (discussing higher debt-loads and default rates for
students at for-profit colleges).
38. See infra Part II.B, E (discussing deceptive claims by recruiters about
graduation rates, employment, and earning prospects after graduation from forprofit school, and high default and low repayment rates, in part driven by low
graduation rates at these schools).
39. SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, TRENDS IN FOR-PROFIT
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: ENROLLMENT, PRICES, STUDENT AID AND OUTCOMES
1 (2011), http://advocacy.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/11b_3376_Trends_
Brief_4Pass_110414.pdf.
40. Id.; see also COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 25 figs.17A,
17B
(2010)
[hereinafter
TRENDS
IN
COLLEGE
PRICING
2010],
http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/20101027_CollBd2010Pricing.pdf (showing fulltime and part-time enrollments in the various sectors from 2000 to 2009).
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equivalents (FTEs).41 In 2009–2010, 3.3 million undergraduates
and 431,000 graduate students attended for-profit schools.42 By
2011–12, based on further growth, the for-profit sector was
enrolling about 13% of all full-time students.43
It is a misconception that for-profit schools operate mostly in
the sphere of shorter or part-time programs.44 Students in the forprofit sector are primarily enrolled in four-year degree programs
(61% in fall 2009), with 24% of this sector’s students in two-year
institutions and 15% in less-than-two-year schools.45 In addition,
most students at for-profit colleges go to school full-time, at an
even higher rate than college students as a whole.46 Among
undergraduates in the for-profit sector, 77% are enrolled full-time
(as of fall 2009), while for all undergraduates, 64% are full-time
students.47 For-profit graduate programs also grew rapidly in
recent years, with their share of degrees rising from 1% to 7% of
all graduate degrees awarded in the decade ending in the
academic year 2007–2008.48

41. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 1 (noting that 62% of postsecondary
students enrolled full-time).
42. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS AND
PRICE OF ATTENDANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010–11; DEGREES AND OTHER
AWARDS CONFERRED: 2009–10; AND 12–MONTH ENROLLMENT: 2009–10, at 14 tbl.6
(2011) [hereinafter NCES, POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS], http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2011/2011250.pdf (counting enrollment by headcount, which means
counting part-time students the same as those going to school full-time, and
showing 3.3 million undergraduates and 431,000 graduate students at for-profit
colleges in 2009–10); id. at 15 tbl.7 (counting full-time-equivalent enrollment
and showing 2.3 million undergraduates and 246,000 graduate students at forprofit institutions).
43. COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 7 (2011) [hereinafter
TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011], http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/
College_Pricing_2011.pdf.
44. See BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 1 (breaking down for-profit school
enrollment in the fall of 2009 by program duration, full-time or part-time, and
undergraduate students as compared to total number of students enrolled).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

MORTGAGING HUMAN CAPITAL

451

B. Aggressive Recruiting
Recruiting by for-profit colleges has ranged from aggressive
to deceptive and even fraudulent. In a 2010 study, investigators
from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) posed as
prospective students and registered to receive information on web
sites; they quickly received numerous telephone calls, as many as
twenty-four in the first twenty-four hours and 182 within a
month.49 The GAO investigators also posed as in-person
applicants and found that all fifteen for-profit schools they visited
engaged in “deceptive or otherwise questionable statements,”
such as misinformation about accreditation, questionable
information about graduation rates, misrepresentations that
students were guaranteed employment upon completion and at
salaries that few could actually expect to garner, and deceptive
information about the duration and cost of the colleges’
programs.50 Although some schools’ representatives gave
accurate, helpful, and reasonable information, advising
applicants of risks, the investigators encountered argumentative
and scolding recruiters, marketing techniques that required
applicants to enroll before getting information, and overall hardsell tactics.51
The worst practices found by the GAO involved
encouragement to falsify information on federal financial aid
forms (four of the fifteen schools visited).52 Schools’ recruiters also
attempted to lead applicants to believe that student loans would
not be collected and aided them in cheating on application tests

49. GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIR., FORENSICS AUDITS AND SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, TESTIMONY
BEFORE S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES, UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND
ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 3, 14–16
(2010) (describing “flood of calls” to four fictitious prospective students who
registered on websites). The for-profit college industry attacked this GAO study,
leading to a reinvestigation and revision of the study; the revised results are
discussed in the text above and in the report. Id. at 9, 8 tbl.1, 12, app. I at 19–
27.
50. Id. at 9–11.
51. Id. at 12–14.
52. Id. at 7–8, 12.
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(by coaching or permitting extra time or a retest to get a higher
score).53
A practice that is prohibited by law is providing commissions
or other incentive payments to recruiters based “directly or
indirectly” on success in enrolling students.54 Despite the
prohibition on incentive-based compensation, allegations have
surfaced of continuance of the practice: for example, four states
and the U.S. Department of Justice joined as intervenors in a
whistleblower
lawsuit
against
Education
Management
Corporation alleging continued used of incentive-based
commissions.55
C. High Net Price
To compare tuition and fees of various sectors, one has to
take into account the difference between published prices and
what students pay after grant aid from all sources, public and
private. The sticker price is not the price paid by most students,
as will be detailed below. Although average published prices for
tuition and fees are up across the board in recent years, inflationadjusted net prices actually declined in the five years from 2005–
2006 to 2010–2011 due to increases in federal and institutional
grant aid.56 In 2011–2012, net prices were still down compared to
those five years earlier at private nonprofit four-year and public
two-year institutions, while they increased slightly at public fouryear schools, but much less than published prices.57 Only about a
53. Id. at 12.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20) (2006). See Career College Assn. v. Duncan, 796
F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. D.C. 2011) (upholding regulation barring incentive
compensation to recruiters).
55. See Joint Complaint in Intervention by the United States of America,
and the States of California, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana ¶¶ 1–11,United
States ex rel. Washington v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., Civ. No. 07-461 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
(alleging violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, and Title IV of the
Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1094); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Files
Complaint Against Education Management Corp. Alleging False Claims Act
Violations, JUST. NEWS, Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
August/11-civ-1026.html (providing background on Educ. Mgmt. Corp., Civ. No.
07-461 (W.D. Pa. 2011)).
56. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010, supra note 40, at 4, 8.
57. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011, supra note 43, at 4 (noting that at
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third of college students pay the full published prices at nonprofit
and public institutions.58
The average published tuition and fees for full-time
undergraduates in 2011–2012, gathered by the College Board,
were:
Public two-year
$2,963
Public four-year (in state)
$8,244
Private for-profit
$14,487
Private nonprofit four-year
$28,50059
Again, these published prices are not the same as what students
actually pay. Here is the College Board’s estimated net average
payment for tuition and fees for 2011–12, once grant aid and
federal tax credits and deductions are taken into account:
Public two-year
Public four-year (in state)
Private for-profit
Private nonprofit four-year

($810)60
$2,490
$4,700
$12,97061

Students received on average the following estimated annual
amounts in grant aid from all sources in 2011–2012: $3,770 at
two-year public schools, $5,750 at public four-year colleges, and

public four-year institutions in the period 2006–2007 to 2011–2012, inflationadjusted published prices increased by an average of 5.1% per year, while
inflation-adjusted net prices at these schools increased on average by 1.4% a
year).
58. Id. at 8; see also TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010, supra note 40, at 3
(indicating some of that third who do not receive grant aid receive federal tax
credits and deductions that help to cover expenses); COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN
STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 21 (noting increase in tax savings in the
form of education tax credits and deductions from $6.6 billion in 2008 to $14.7
billion in 2009, both in 2009 dollars, and also noting that the income ceiling for
the tax credit went up from $120,000 to $180,000 for joint filers).
59. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011, supra note 43, at 3; see also id. at 7
(noting that although the College Board provides information on for-profit
colleges’ average published and net prices, these should be interpreted with
caution because they are based on a small sample compared to the data on
prices at public and nonprofit schools).
60. The figure is negative because grant aid and tax subsidies on average
exceed tuition and fees; the excess can go to other expenses, such as books and
room and board.
61. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011, supra note 43, at 15 fig. 7.
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$15,530 at private nonprofit four-year schools.62 The College
Board did not report an average amount of grant aid for students
at for-profit schools, and it urges caution in interpreting its
pricing information for these schools because of difficulty in
obtaining data and the resulting small sample size.63
Grant aid at for-profit schools has been lower on average
because they do not offer much institutional grant aid.64 In 2007–
2008, for example, full-time undergraduate students at for-profit
colleges received on average about $140 in institutional grant aid,
compared to over $7,000 at private nonprofit colleges.65 Total
grant aid from all sources for full-time dependent students at forprofit schools averaged $3,610, with 75% of the grant aid being
federal grants, compared to $7,050 in grants on average in 2007–
2008 at four-year public colleges, only 25% of it federal.66 It
should be remembered that public universities typically have
lower published and net tuition and fees to begin with than forprofit institutions.67 At private nonprofit institutions in 2007–
2008, grant aid for fulltime dependent students ranged widely
across the four quartiles of pricing, with average grants in each
group, from lowest- to highest-priced schools, as follows: $7,700,
$14,550, $17,620, $21,860.68 Overall, the average net price at
either a two-year or a four-year public school was significantly
lower than at a for-profit school, and even at private nonprofit
colleges, the average net price is lower or only moderately higher
in the lower two quartiles of pricing.69 Private nonprofit schools
62. Id. (noting that these figures are estimates based on prior years and
available information but not full financial aid data). No figure was given for
grant aid at for-profit schools. See supra note 59 (concerning difficulty of
obtaining data).
63. Id.
64. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 4 fig. 3 (showing that in 2007–2008,
73% of grant aid at four-year nonprofit schools and 34% at four-year public
schools came from institutional sources, while only 7% of grant aid at for-profit
schools was from institutional sources).
65. Id. at 4
66. Id. at 4 fig. 3, tbl.4.
67. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
68. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 4 tbl.4.
69. Id. (showing the following net average prices, including all expenses, in
2007–2008: $6,480 for two-year public schools, $9,030 for public four-year
schools in-state, $16,510 for for-profit institutions, and the following four
average net prices, by pricing quartile, for private nonprofit schools: $12,030,
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received only 9% of their grant aid from the federal government
in 2007–2008.70 Even at nonprofit schools with the highest sticker
price, need-based grant aid for low-income students often makes
this a cheaper option, and one that comes with better outcomes
for those qualified for admission.71
D. Reliance on Federal Grant Aid and Student Loans
A key feature of the for-profit college business model is
maximum use of federal student aid, both grants and loans. “In
2009, the five largest for-profit institutions received 77% of their
revenues from federal student aid programs.”72 They are
permitted to get up to 90% of revenue from Title IV, Higher
Education Act funds.73 The rest can be taken from other federal
$17,400, $20,570, and $24,140).
70. Id. at 4 fig. 3.
71. Some elite private nonprofit colleges have set family income levels
below which students pay nothing for their education. At Yale University, for
example, undergraduates from families with annual income under $65,000 pay
nothing. See YALE, FINANCIAL AID, http://admissions.yale.edu/financial-aid
(reporting, additionally, that 57% of undergraduates received need-based
financial aid from the university).
72. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,618;
see also supra note 1 (explaining that the analysis throughout this Article does
not include for-profit schools that are not reported in federal data because they
do not participate in federal student aid programs).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24) (2006). In a previous version of this percentage
cap, instituted in 1992, schools could receive no more than 85% of their revenue
from Higher Education Act Title IV funds. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS-97-104, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, H.R. SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RES.,
COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: MILLIONS SPENT
TO TRAIN STUDENTS FOR OVERSUPPLIED OCCUPATIONS 6 (1997) (discussing the
“85-15” rule of the Higher Education Act). The 90/10 rule was put into effect by
the 1998 HEA Amendments (Pub. L. No. 105-244), replacing its predecessor, the
85/15 rule, which was authorized by the 1992 HEA Amendments (Pub. L. No.
102-235). A further reduction of the 90/10 rule’s impact occurred under the
Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 3078 (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. § 1001–1161 (2006)), which changed the 90/10 rule from an
institution eligibility test to a condition for program participation and allowed
additional resources to be counted as institutional revenue. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1094(a)(24) (2006). Institutions that do not comply with the rule are now
allowed to continue participation in the federal aid programs for two years.
Kathleen S. Tighe, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Educ., Statement Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Educ. Labor, and Pensions 4–5 (June 24, 2010),
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tighe.pdf. (explaining the operation of the
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programs, such as those for veterans, or from private student
loans,74 meaning that the schools do not necessarily have any
skin in the game as far as outcomes for students. With the decline
of availability of private student loans, for-profit schools have
increased their institutional lending to their own students, and if
institutional lending is combined with increased tuition, schools
can pass the 90% test without reducing the amount of federal aid
they receive.75
The 11% of all full-time equivalent (FTE) postsecondary
students enrolled in for-profit schools in 2008–2009 received 24%
of federal Pell Grants.76
They also received 28% of the
unsubsidized and 25% of the subsidized Stafford loans, compared
to 6% and 8%, respectively, for the 27% of all FTE students at
public two-year institutions.77 The federal funds going to forprofit schools in 2009 amounted to “more than $4 billion in Pell
grants and $20 billion in federal student loans.”78

90/10 Rule and stating that the 2008 changes “made it easier for the institutions
to meet the 90/10 Rule”).
74. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43,618 (noting that federal funds other than Title IV HEA funds can be counted
toward the 10% minimum, including veterans’ education benefits and federal job
training funds).
75. See supra note 5 (discussing for-profit schools responding to reduced
private lending by making loans themselves); see also Eisman, Subprime Goes
to College, Presentation at the Ira Sohn Conference, supra note 6, at slide 25
(discussing raising tuition and forcing students to get non-federal aid to make
up the difference as a way to pass the 90/10 rule).
76. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 3 tbl.2. The College Board reported
that the percentage of FTEs in the for-profit sector a year later, in 2009–2010,
had risen to 12%, with 25% of Pell Grant dollars going to them, and since
expenditures on Pell Grants rose from $18.1 billion in 2008–2009 to $30.4 billion
in 2009–2010, that would put the total Pell Grant dollars going to for-profits in
the latter year at $7.6 billion. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at
4,16, 22.
77. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 39, at 3 tbl.2; COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN
STUDENT AID 4 (2010).
78. KUTZ, supra note 49, (in highlights, page prior to page 1).
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E. Higher Debts and Higher Default Rates; Lower Graduation
and Repayment Rates
For-profit college students take out more loans than students
in public or private nonprofit institutions and fail to repay at
higher rates, despite the premise of career college education that
its mission is to add income that will allow students to repay
student loans.79 Among completers of bachelor’s programs in
2007–2008, for example, the median student debt (on federal and
non-federal loans) of for-profit college graduates (including
nonborrowers) was $31,157, compared to $16,175 at private
nonprofit schools and $6,998 for public institutions.80 For
completers of two-year associate’s degree programs the same
year, the disparity was particularly pronounced, with the median
debt being zero at public schools, while it was $18,415 at forprofit schools and $10,000 at private nonprofit institutions.81 The
zero debt median at public two-year programs is due to the very
low tuition at many community colleges, so that students can
often pay as they go from income and grants. By comparison,
tuition at two-year for-profit programs is typically nearly as
expensive per year as at four-year for-profit programs.82 The GAO
investigation discussed above noted that a comparison of nearby
for-profit and public two-year programs reveals instances of forprofit programs that are six to thirteen times more expensive.83
Another useful comparison is the percentage of students in the
various sectors who receive bachelor’s degrees who are more than
$30,000 in debt; in 2007–2008, the figure was 57% of for-profit
four-year degree recipients, while it was 25% at private nonprofit
schools and 13% at public schools.84 Only 4% of bachelor’s degree
79. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43657 (discussing industry spokesman’s argument that “the students receiving
loans will, in almost every case, be enabled to repay them out of the added
income”).
80. Id. at 43,647 tbl.A-1.
81. Id.
82. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
tbl.347
(2010),
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_347.asp
(showing median tuition and fees for 2009–2010 at for-profit schools of $14,212
for four-year schools and $13,548 for two-year schools).
83. KUTZ, supra note 49, at 17.
84. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
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recipients at for-profit colleges had no debt that year, while the
debt-free figure was 38% at public universities and 28% at
private nonprofits.85 At the associate degree level in 2007–2008,
only 5% of public college graduates had debt of $20,000 or more,
while 42% of for-profit graduates had debt that high;86 of public
two-year graduates that year, 62% had no debt, compared to only
2% with no debt among private for-profit associate degree
graduates.87
Former students of for-profit colleges also have high default
and low repayment rates, in part driven by low graduation
rates.88 Avoiding default is not the same as repaying. Many
students become delinquent without being counted as defaulting,
and others get deferments and forbearances, which also are not
counted as defaults. A study of student-loan borrowers in all
higher education sectors who entered repayment in 2005 found
that over the next five years, 37% repaid on time, 23% postponed
repayment by deferment or forbearance and thus avoided default,
26% were delinquent without being counted as in default, and
15% defaulted, under program definitions that generally do not
count a delinquency as a default for at least 270 days.89 In sum,
43,650. The College Board reported similar figures a year later: among
dependent four-year degree completers in 2009, nearly two-thirds of those who
graduated from for-profit schools had debt of $28,000 or more, while the same
statistic was 14% at public schools and 25% at private nonprofit schools. TRENDS
IN STUDENT AID 2011, supra note 4, at 18 fig. 9A. Furthermore, the differences in
completion rates were striking: 64% of students at public four-year schools and
71% at private nonprofits, but only 15% of students at for-profit schools (for
2003–2004 beginning postsecondary dependent students who last attended a
four-year institution and who received a bachelor’s degree by 2009). Id. at 18.
85. TRENDS IN FOR-PROFIT POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 39, at 5
& Table 6.
86. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,650.
87. TRENDS IN FOR-PROFIT POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 39, at 5
& tbl.6.
88. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43,654 (concerning low relative completion rates for students at four-year forprofit schools compared to the other sectors’ four-year schools).
89. See Alisa F. Cunningham & Gregory S. Kienzl, Delinquency: The
Untold Story of Student Loan Borrowing, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, Mar.
2011, at 4–6, 8 (summarizing results concerning payment on time, deferment
and forbearance, delinquency, and default for debtors who entered repayment in
2005 and were followed for five years while also noting that student-loan
debtors are not generally considered in default until 270 days to 360 days of
delinquency).
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looking at all sectors together, the debtors who went into default
or delinquency exceeded those who paid on time, not counting
those who got deferments or forbearances.
When these figures are broken down by higher education
sector, differences are dramatic in a comparison of those who
attended four-year for-profits as opposed to four-year nonprofit
and public institutions. Combined delinquencies and defaults
after five years for those who entered repayment in 2005 were as
follows: private nonprofits (28% total, broken down 20%
delinquent/8% in default), public (34% total, broken down 24%
delinquent/10% in default); and for-profit (53% total, broken
down 29% delinquent/24% in default).90 The figures are closer in
a comparison of two-year institutions, with combined
delinquencies and defaults of: public (60% total, broken down
36% delinquent/24% in default) and for-profit (63% total, broken
down 27% delinquent/36% in default).91 There is generally less
delinquency and default among borrowers who complete degrees
as opposed to those who do not,92 and students at for-profit fouryear programs leave within three years without enrolling
elsewhere at more than three times the rate of students at public
and private nonprofit four-year programs.93 While students at
public two-year schools leave without a degree at a higher rate
than students at for-profit two-year schools,94 most two-year
public school students do not have to incur student-loan debt.95
Each fiscal year, the government has published official
national student loan two-year “cohort default rates,”96 which
90. Id. at 23.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 24 (showing, for example, 35% total delinquency and default for
graduates of for-profit schools, compared to a 64% for those who left without a
degree).
93. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,655
tbl. C (showing 34% rate for-profits, 10.8% for publics, and 10.0% rate for
private nonprofits of leaving four-year schools within three years without
enrolling elsewhere); see also supra note 84 (concerning five-year graduation
rates of students at four-year schools in all three sectors).
94. Id. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43,655 (showing that 34.1% of students at public two-year program leave within
three years without a degree and without enrolling elsewhere, compared to
26.6% of students in for-profit two-year programs).
95. See supra notes 81, 87 and accompanying text.
96. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Education, Default Rates Rise for
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have risen in recent years for all sectors. From fiscal year 2008 to
fiscal year 2009, the overall cohort default rate, published by the
government in September 2011, rose from 7% to 8.8%. In the forprofit sector, the increase was from 11.6% to 15%.97 These figures
are primarily useful for showing trends and comparing sectors
because, as discussed above, they are based on program
definitions of default that exclude delinquencies, deferments, and
forbearances, and they count only defaults on loans that came
due in one fiscal year and defaulted by the end of the next fiscal
year, but not defaults that occur later.98
Other measures better capture the risk of attending for-profit
institutions. For every 100 students who completed a program at
a public or nonprofit school in 2007–2008, there were four former
students who entered repayment in 2008 and defaulted the next
year, while at for-profit institutions, there were 18 defaulters per
100 completers, that is, more than four times as many defaulters
as in the other sectors.99 When only four-year programs are
considered, the defaulters to completers ratio was 25 per 100.100
Another measure is how many borrowers are repaying any
principal on their loans within three years after leaving school:
the figures for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 were 80% of
borrowers who attended public schools, 88% who attended
nonprofit institutions, and only 55% in the case of career
colleges.101 Looking at the same period and applying a test of
percentage of institutions in the sector that had at least a 35%
repayment rate, the figures were 89% for four-year public and
nonprofit institutions, 73% for public two-year institutions, and
less than 60% for all for-profit schools.102 The 35% repayment
Federal Student Loans (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/
news/press-releases/default-rates-rise-federal-student-loans (noting that official
FY 2009 national student loan cohort default rate is a snapshot of the borrowers
whose repayments came due between Oct. 1, 2008, and Sept. 30, 2009,
indicating the percentage that defaulted before Sept. 30, 2010, and not including
defaults after that time).
97. Id.
98. Supra notes 89, 96 and accompanying text.
99. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,652.
100. Id. at 43,653–54 (noting that this default to completion ratio indicates
“substantial barriers to providing value to enrollees”).
101. Id. at 43,654.
102. Id.
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measure has been given a central role in the new gainful
employment regulation,103 discussed in Part III.B below.
F. Less Spending on Instruction
For-profit colleges spend the least on instruction in dollars
and percentage of overall expenditures.104 The disparity is
greatest among four-year institutions, with about 21% of all
expenditures by for-profit schools used for instruction, compared
to 25% at public schools and 33% at nonprofits in 2008–2009.105
The expenditures per FTE student at four-year schools in that
year, total and for instruction (in parentheses), were as follows in
the various sectors: $12,654 ($2,633) at for-profit colleges,
$36,707 ($7,462) at public schools, and $46,080 ($15,143) at
nonprofits.106 While they spent less on instruction, for-profit fouryear schools spent more on categories that include executive
salaries and investor returns, the latter being something public
and nonprofit schools do not have to fund.107 For-profit schools
also increased their expenditures on lobbying as the DOE
considered new regulation; whether or not as a result, the
proposed regulation was watered down.108
103. See Gainful Employment Rule, supra note 10.
104. Table 378, National Center for Education Statistics, 2010 Tables and
Figures (Nov. 2010) http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_378.asp.
The table shows that in 2008–2009, for-profit degree-granting schools spent
23.66% of all expenditures on instruction, 20.81% at four-year schools and
32.56% at two-year schools; per FTE student, they spent $12,654 total and
$2,633 on instruction at four-year schools and $13,498 total and $4,394 on
instruction at two-year schools. Id.
105. Id. at tbls.373, 375.
106. Id.
107. Id. (showing that at four-year institutions in 2008–2009, public schools
spent about 18% of total expenditures on academic support, student services,
and institutional support, while nonprofits spent about 26% and for-profits
spent about 71%); see also Nancy Lewis, For-Profit Enrollment Grew 50-Fold
from 1980–2009, YOUTH TODAY (May 26, 2011), http://www.youthtoday.org/
view_article.cfm?article_id=4805 (quoting an NCES commissioner on the point
that the support categories include executive compensation and returns to
shareholders).
108. Eric Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, Profit-Making Colleges Diluted
New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at A1 (describing how the industry’s
“ferocious response” produced a “much weakened final plan”); Paul Blumenthal,
Regulations Lead to Lobbying Surge by the For-Profit College Industry,
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G. Recent Declining Enrollment

For-profit colleges have been reporting declining enrollments
since late 2010.109 This seems to be due to a combination of
decreased interest by prospective students but also reduced
recruiting by this sector as it attempts to ride out negative
publicity, increased attention by regulators and other public
officials, and the bad economy.110
III. The Weak Regulatory Framework and Lack of Relief
for Debtors
A. History of Federal Support for For-Profit Institutions
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) established the
Guaranteed Student Loan Program.111 Originally, only students
SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (Mar. 10, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://sunlight
foundation.com/blog/2011/03/10/regulations-lead-to-lobbying-surge-by-the-for-profitcollege-industry/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting tripling of lobbying
expenditures from 2009 to 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Bennett Roth, For-Profit Colleges Field Team of Top Lobbyists, ROLLCALL (May 2,
2011), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_114/-205206-1.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2012) (concerning hiring of many top lobbyists to stop or roll back the proposed
Gainful Employment Rule) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. See Korn, supra note 14 (discussing declines in enrollments of up to
45% because of industry decisions to reduce aggressive recruiting and in
addition due to student resistance to debt and risk); Rachel Wiseman,
Enrollments Plunge at Many For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept.
2, 2011, at A33.
110. Alan Scher Zagier, Tracking Trends: For-Profit Colleges Respond to
Increased Scrutiny, COMMUNITY COLLEGE WEEK, (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.ccweek.com/news/templates/template.aspx?articleid=2688&zoneid=3
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (discussing declining enrollment and revenue at forprofit colleges, at least partly by industry design because of increased regulatory
scrutiny) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Robert
Schroeder, Lobbying Up, Earnings Down at For-Profit Colleges, MARKET WATCH
(Oct. 27, 2011, 10:54 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lobbying-upearnings-down-at-for-profit-schools-2011-10-27 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra Part II.B and
infra Part III.
111. Higher Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2006)). The Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 2009, signed into law in 2010 as part of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, eliminated future federally
guaranteed student loans and replaced them with direct federal student loans
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at public and nonprofit schools were eligible to receive Title IV
HEA funds.112 Proprietary school students became eligible for this
federal aid in 1972.113 Changes in 1979 made private student-loan
lenders more willing to lend to students at for-profit schools by
removing a federal interest subsidy limit and thus encouraging
lenders to take the risk.114 As a result, proprietary schools grew,
fueled by revenue from federal student grant and loan funds, and
by the late 1980s they had become the focus of congressional
oversight attention and class action litigation alleging that these
schools were aggressively recruiting the poor and the homeless
from welfare lines and laundromats and using help-wanted ads
promising better jobs to get students to enroll.115 As today, the
risk of default on student loans was compared to a recent
financial meltdown; in the earlier era, it was the savings and loan
crisis,116 and today, it is the mortgage crisis.117 In other words, we
have been here before in witnessing the burgeoning of a for-profit
higher education sector that focused more on harvesting federal
student aid dollars than on delivering results to students.118
starting July 1, 2010. See Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009;
FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/educators/20090715hr3221.phtml (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra
note 4.
112. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, supra note 73, at 5.
113. Id.; see also Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86
Stat. 235, 375.
114. Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary
Institutions of Higher Education and What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40
J.L. & EDUC. 225, 229 (2011); see also Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for
Continuing Educ. & Training, Inc., 168 F.3d 1362, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting
amendments to the Higher Education Act).
115. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Federal Trade Commission Holder Rule
and Its Applicability to Student Loans—Reallocating the Risk of Proprietary
School Failure, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 636–38 (1991) (describing
aggressive and deceptive recruiting and failure to follow through on promises of
a better life to the economically vulnerable and citing congressional oversight
hearings and complaints in class action litigation).
116. Id. at 639.
117. See Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6; infra
Part IV.A.
118. Hearing on Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the For-Profit Education
Section Before the Sen. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor & Pensions 1
(2010) (statement of Margaret Reiter, former supervising deputy attorney
general in the Consumer Law Section of the California Attorney General’s
Office) (“By the mid 1990’s, I thought, naively it turns out, that we had turned
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The problems with proprietary schools in the 1980s led to
new regulation using cohort default rates (CDR).119 Effective in
1991, schools were barred from receiving federal student aid
funds if their CDR met or exceeded a 25% rate for three
consecutive years.120 The CDR is a snapshot measure, until
recently based on the number of students who entered student
loan repayment in one fiscal year who had defaulted by the end of
the next school year.121 Large numbers of the earlier for-profit
schools were put out of business by the withdrawal of federal
student aid dollars in the 1990s due to failure to meet the CDR
limit for three years.122 The for-profit schools in that earlier era
were largely small and thus local and often focused on nondegree
training for a trade, albeit with poor results.123
As trade schools closed down in the 1990s, the for-profit
sector morphed into its current form. The new for-profit sector is
characterized by large institutions offering conventional college
degrees and organized as publicly traded companies,124 with everthe corner on fraud and abuse in the proprietary school industry.”).
119. Student Loan Default Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq.).
120. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-135, STUDENT LOANS:
DEFAULT RATES NEED TO BE COMPUTED MORE APPROPRIATELY 4 (July 1999)
(noting context of study focusing on depressive effect on the CDR of excluding
students placed into deferment or forebearance).
121. Id. at 5. In 2008, Congress increased the three-year maximum default
rate from 25% to 30%, effective in 2011. Higher Education Opportunity Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 436(a)(1) (2008). It also changed from a two-year to a
three-year cohort default rate. Id. § 436(e); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-09-600, supra note 9, at 13.
122. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, supra note 9 at 11
(stating that from 1991 to 1999, 1,580 proprietary schools and 1,846 schools
total were subject to sanctions based on their default rates).
123. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, supra note 73, at 5
(noting in 1997 that “[m]ost proprietary schools are small, enrolling fewer than
100 students, and offer occupational training lasting 2 years or less”).
124. See HARKIN, EMERGING RISK?, supra note 19, at 2 (noting concentration
of growth in enrollment at for-profit schools at those run by 14 publicly-traded
companies); see also supra Part II.A (concerning move into degree-granting
programs, particularly bachelor’s degrees); James Coleman & Richard Vedder,
For-Profit Education in the United States: A Primer, CENTER FOR COLLEGE
AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY, May 2008, at 21, available at http://www.
policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20592.pdf. (showing initial public
offerings by eight of the largest for-profit college companies between 1988 and
2003, with six occurring in the 1990s).
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increasing sophistication in rent-seeking and regulatory
evasion.125 CDR regulation has proven insufficient to shut down
the worst current performers. Not only does the CDR use a short
time horizon, although recently extended from two to three
years,126 but it is also subject to manipulation because it excludes
students who are in deferment or forbearance, which schools can
help their students to pursue in the short term to keep CDR
down.127 Only recently has DOE focused on positive repayment as
a test for eligibility for federal student aid funds, as will be
discussed next.
B. New Gainful Employment Rule
On June 13, 2011, DOE published its final Gainful
Employment Rule (GER), culminating a two-year regulatory
process.128 DOE published a proposed rule on July 26, 2010,129
and it then received 90,000 comments, 75% of them negative.130
125. See Blumenthal, supra note 108 (concerning tripling in lobbying
expenditures from 2008 to 2009); see also Eisman, supra note 6, at 25–26 of
PowerPoint presentation (concerning manipulations of cohort default rates,
discussed supra at notes 119–20 and accompanying text and infra at notes 126–
27 and accompanying text, and of 90/10 rule, discussed supra at notes 73–75
and accompanying text).
126. See supra note 121.
127. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-135, supra note 120, at
3–8, 10–12 (reporting doubling of the rate of deferment and forbearance from
1993 to 1996 and examining the problem of CDR methodology allowing
manipulation but finding in 1999 that proprietary schools were not doing so
disproportionately and in fact had lower deferment and forbearance rates than
other schools); Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at
43651 (discussing how some colleges work hard to keep their default rates down
by assisting former students to use deferment and forbearance options).
128. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34388; Office of
Postsecondary Education; Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking for Programs
Authorized Under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as Amended, 74
Fed. Reg. 46399 (Sep. 9, 2009) (announcing the beginning of the process).
129. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43,616.
130. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34390 (noting
that in addition to giving the figures in the text, the DOE stated that many
comments were not specific, stated only general opposition or support for the
proposed rule, appeared generated by petition drives and letter-writing
campaigns, and expressed general support for making sure that student loans
are affordable).
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Meanwhile, many members of Congress, prompted by heavy
industry lobbying, also opposed the rule and sought to deny DOE
funds to implement it.131 Given this backdrop, it is perhaps
surprising that any rule was promulgated, but DOE pressed on,
simplifying the rule, reducing its requirements, and setting an
effective date of July 1, 2012,132 but with no program ineligibility
as a consequence prior to 2015.133 A leading for-profit industry
trade association, however, brought suit on July 20, 2011, to
block the GER, arguing inter alia that DOE lacks authority to
make the rule.134 DOE addressed its authority to issue the rule in
its final regulatory analysis, relying on the section of the HEA
that defines an eligible program to include one that provides
“training to prepare students for gainful employment in a
recognized profession.”135 DOE also pointed to broad
congressional delegations of administrative power, under which
the Secretary of Education “is authorized to prescribe such rules
and regulations as the Secretary determines necessary or
appropriate to administer and manage the functions of the
Secretary or the Department,”136 and may “make, promulgate,

131. See Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note 6, ¶ 12 (stating that “289 Members of the House of Representatives—231
Republicans and 58 Democrats—voted in February 2011 to deny the
Department [of Education] any funds to implement the Gainful Employment
regulations” (citation omitted)); see also supra note 108 (concerning heavy
lobbying by the industry).
132. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34386.
133. Mark Kantrowitz, Summary and Analysis of Gainful Employment
Final Rule, FINAID.ORG (June 2, 2011), available at http://www.finaid.org/
educators/20110602gainfulemployment.pdf (noting that given use of tests that
require failing three out of four years, there will be no immediate loss of
eligibility and that 2015 is the earliest that a program could lose eligibility).
134. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
6, at 54 (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief), ¶ 5 (arguing that the
regulatory tests “are beyond the Department’s statutory authority” in light of
detailed statutory requirements concerning maximum student debt levels and
loan default rates).
135. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also Gainful Employment Rule
Analysis, supra note 11, at 34392. The phrase “gainful employment” is also
found in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1088 (2006).
136. 20 U.S.C. § 3474 (2006); see also Gainful Employment Rule Analysis,
supra note 11, at 34392.
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issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations” for DOE
programs, including the federal student aid programs.137
As finally promulgated, the GER sets up two tests, and only
if a program fails both of these tests for three out of four years
does it lose eligibility to receive Title IV Higher Education Act
(HEA) student aid funds, which include both federal grants and
federal student loans.138 The first test concerns the repayment
rate of former students, and the second focuses on the debt-toincome (DTI) ratios of completers of programs.139
The student loan repayment rate of a program is not the
same as the rate of former students not in default. This is
because default is defined narrowly as not meeting DOE
requirements: those not counted as in default include former
students who get deferments and forbearances, and also those
who are delinquent but not yet in default (defined as up to a year
of delinquency).140 Under the repayment test, schools will remain
eligible to receive federal student aid if 35% of their former
students are repaying at least some principal on their loans (even
$1).141 This is a reduction from the proposed rule, which set 45%
repayment as the threshold for no consequences, with a restricted
eligibility category below that.142 The final rule adopted a
simplified approach, in that it eliminated the use of two tiers,
with a restricted category and enhanced disclosure requirements
between 35% and 45% repayment; the final rule sets 35% as the
sole repayment test and places no restrictions on those passing
this test or one of the alternative DTI ratios, discussed below.143
Even below 35% repayment (as well as missing the DTI ratios), a
program suffers only enhanced disclosure requirements by
missing for a year or two.144 The formula for the 35% repayment
test has some additional leeway built in. Schools can choose
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3 (2006); see also Gainful Employment Rule Analysis,
supra note 11, at 34392.
138. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34388.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 34408–10 (discussing who is counted as repaying).
141. Gainful Employment Rule, supra note 10 (setting up a complex formula
to make this calculation).
142. See Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34393–95.
143. Id. at 34395, 34400; see also supra note10.
144. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(j) (2011).
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between two-year and four-year repayment periods,145 and they
can also include as repaying former students who are not paying
principal but are in a public-service repayment program146 and up
to 3% of students making income-contingent or income-based
repayment.147 Some loans are excluded entirely from the
formula—those loans in deferment because the students are
continuing their educations or are in the military and also those
of students who have died or who have been discharged by the
Secretary of Education for total and permanent disability or are
under consideration for that type of discharge.148
Alternatively, a program can remain eligible under either
part of a two-pronged DTI test. The typical annual student loan
payment, including private student loans, of completers of
programs must be 12% or less of annual earnings or 30% or less
of discretionary income; programs may choose either mean or
median figures using either test.149 The inclusion of only
completers of programs is obviously quite forgiving to the forprofit industry, given their high noncompletion rates.150 The final
rule kept the DTI ratios of the proposed rule, which had already
been increased by 50% each from research-based and industryused standards, thus providing leeway to withstand various
criticisms of these standards.151 DOE described these DTI ratios
145. Id. § 668.7(a)(2)(iv)–(v), (b)(1)(ii) (2011).
146. Id. § 668.7(b)(3)(B) (2011).
147. Id. § 668.7(b)(3)(C) (2011).
148. Id. § 668.7(b)(4) (2011).
149. Id. § 668.7(c)(2) (2011) (concerning inclusion only of program
completers); id. § 668.7(c)(3) (using either median or mean for both the annual
loan payment and income figures). The repayment rate test does not include
private student loans, but the DTI ratios do. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(b)(1), (c)(4)(i)
(2011).
150. See supra notes 84, 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing much
lower completion rate at for-profit schools and association generally of noncompletion with higher rates of delinquency and default on student loans).
151. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43620.
The proposed rule discusses how DOE started with a DTI ratio of 20% of
discretionary income, based on the research of economists Sandy Baum and
Saul Schwarz about the outer boundaries of manageable student debt, and then
added an alternative standard from industry underwriting based on 8% of
annual earnings, before in addition increasing each of these by 50% to the
30%/12% DTI tests. Id.; see also Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note
11, at 34394–95 (noting reliance on Sandy Baum and Saul Schwartz, How Much
Debt is Too Much? Defining Benchmarks for Manageable Student Debt, a 2006
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as establishing “thresholds above which it becomes unambiguous
that a program’s debt levels are excessive.”152
A particularly controversial aspect of the DTI tests is that
they depend on harvesting actual income of school’s graduates
from Social Security Administration (SSA) or other federal
data.153 Schools are permitted to correct the students on the
list,154 but the for-profit industry objected that schools may not
challenge the annual earnings figures obtained from the SSA (a
restriction based on privacy concerns about revealing former
students’ income) and argued that the lack of a meaningful
opportunity to contest this data violates constitutional due
process standards.155
A program loses eligibility to receive HEA student aid grants
and loans only if it does not pass the repayment test or a DTI test
for three out of four years, which means that passing either type
of test in two out of four years is sufficient.156 Furthermore,
DOE’s final rule includes a transition year in which there will be
limited impact on program eligibility; the maximum ineligibility
based on debt measures for the three fiscal years 2012, 2013, and
2014 is for programs with a combined total of students not
exceeding 5% of the students completing programs in 2014 in
that category of institution.157 Beyond that transitional year (with
the first year of ineligibility occurring in 2015),158 DOE estimated
based on historical data that the 35% repayment rate identifies
study for the College Board).
152. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43620.
153. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(c)(3) (2011).
154. Id. § 668.7(e) (2011).
155. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
6, ¶¶ 9, 61, & 114; see also 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(e)(1)(iv) (2011). DOE has responded
by permitting institutions to do their own surveys, which must meet National
Center for Education Statistics standards, if they fail the DTI ratios using SSA
data. See Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34428; 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.7(g)(3) (2011).
156. See supra notes 138, 143–44 and accompanying text.
157. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(k) (2011); see also id. § 668.7(a)(2)(i)(A) (incorporating
definition of 34 C.F.R. § 668.8(c)(3), so that the rule also applies to certain
certificate programs of schools in other categories than for-profit); Gainful
Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34386 (concerning applicability to
certificate programs of public and nonprofit schools).
158. See Kantrowitz, supra note 133.
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approximately the lowest-performing quarter of programs subject
to the GER.159 As a projection, this assumes that schools would
not improve performance at all in response to the new rule. In
addition, even without improvement, some of the bottom quarter
of programs would still remain eligible, given that programs only
need to pass the 35% repayment rate for three out of four years or
alternatively pass a DTI test. DOE aimed only to identify “the
poorest performing programs” and to set “minimum standards”
that “provide flexibility, specifically allowing programs an
opportunity to improve their performance” before losing
eligibility.160
Even after losing eligibility, programs may be able to regain
it. The GER provides that an ineligible program may reestablish
eligibility after the end of the third fiscal year following the fiscal
year in which it lost it.161 Showing that the DOE anticipates
attempts at evasion of sanctions, ineligibility extends not only to
a program but to another program of the same institution that is
“substantially similar to the ineligible program” in part based on
offering “the same credential level.”162
DOE has multiple public policy goals. While recognizing the
need for a “healthy and productive” for-profit sector to increase
the education level of the population, it was also concerned about
devaluation and oversupply of credentials, with resulting labor
oversupplies leading to unemployment or decline in wages and
inability of graduates to support themselves and their families
while also repaying student loans.163 In addition, DOE articulated
goals of protecting taxpayers and students.164 The agency noted
that standards are needed to “protect taxpayers against wasteful
spending on educational programs of little or no value that also

159. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34395–96 (noting
that under the final rule’s definition of the 35% repayment rate, about 26% of
programs across all sectors, public, nonprofit, and for-profit, would not meet
that test). Only certain certificate programs at public and nonprofit schools are
subject to GER. See supra note 157.
160. Id. at 34388.
161. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(l)(2)(ii) (2011).
162. Id.
163. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43617.
164. Id. at 43618.
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lead to high indebtedness for students.”165 Another concern was
that the stigma of default by former students from disadvantaged
neighborhoods sends “an unfortunate message to others—that
seeking an education can have disastrous results.”166
Focusing particularly on students and their need for
protection, the agency noted that they “often lack the necessary
information to evaluate their postsecondary education options”
and may be misled or manipulated by “skillful marketing,
resulting in significant student loan debts without meaningful
career opportunities” and “false information or assurances
regarding future employment prospects and program costs.”167
DOE thus identifies market failures based on asymmetries in
information and sophistication as well as industry use of framing
strategies in recruitment.
Students who take on high-risk student-loan debt and lose
the gamble face dire consequences. DOE summarized as follows:
Former students who default on Federal loans cannot receive
additional title IV aid for postsecondary education. Their
credit rating is destroyed, undermining their ability to rent a
house, get a mortgage, or purchase a car. To the extent they
can get credit, they pay much higher interest. In some States,
they may be denied certain occupational licenses. And,
increasingly, employers consider credit record in their hiring
decisions.168

The agency also distinguished public and private nonprofit
education on the grounds that “for-profit institutions are legally
obligated to make profitability for shareholders the overriding
objective.”169 The for-profit institutions thus are driven to
maximize revenue from federal education programs, leading to
the need for regulatory checks in light of the weak market
policing provided by student choices that are too frequently
uninformed, naïve, or the result of manipulation. In sum, DOE
has a strong set of public policy rationales for its minimalist new
165. Id.
166. Id. at 43622.
167. Id. at 43618, 43622.
168. Id. at 43622.
169. Id. This is true in the sense that officers of for-profit institutions have
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder returns within the bounds of the
law.
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regulation, including consumer protection and wise use of
taxpayer dollars.
C. Lack of Sufficient Debt Relief in Bankruptcy or Otherwise
The minimum standards approach to federal regulation of
for-profit schools stands in stark contrast to the very tough
approach of bankruptcy law toward student-loan debtors who
cannot afford to repay. Career colleges complain that they are
being held to standards that are too high,170 yet their students
shoulder student loans that are nondischargeable in bankruptcy,
absent “undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents.”171 Under the prevailing judicial interpretation of
what “undue hardship” means, there is a rigorous three-part test:
the debtor is unable to support a “minimal” standard of living for
the debtor and the debtor’s dependents if required to repay
student loans, this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant part of the student debt repayment period, and the
debtor must have made good faith efforts to repay the student
debt.172 The debtor bears the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence on each of these tests, and otherwise the debt is
nondischargeable.173 To challenge nondischargeability, a studentloan debtor must bring an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy,
essentially a lawsuit within the umbrella of the bankruptcy case
and thus an expensive venture, dependent as it is on elaborate
factual proof that many debtors, particularly some of the worst
off, have no hope of funding.174
6.

170.

Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note

171. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a)(2) (2006).
172. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395,
396 (2d Cir. 1987).
173. Rifino v. United States, 245 F.3d 1083, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2001).
174. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan
Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179, 183
(2009) (“Debtors who have filed for bankruptcy in the first instance as a result of
financial distress must somehow find the resources to litigate a full-blown
lawsuit in order to prove that their predicament qualifies them for relief from
their student loans.”); see also 11 U.S.C. App. Rule 7001(6) (2006) (providing
that a proceeding to determine the nondischargeability of a debt is an adversary
proceeding).
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Another problem in bankruptcy is that unlike many other
nondischargeable debts, student loan claims are not given
priority status, which would allow debtors to repay them in
Chapter 13 ahead of general unsecured debts.175 The bankruptcy
courts have attempted creative approaches to make Chapter 13
work for student-loan debtors despite lack of clear statutory
authority to pay these loans ahead of other unsecured debts.176
The nondischargeability of student-loan debt absent undue
hardship is permanent, a life sentence, but it has not always been
thus. Student loans were dischargeable until 1976, when
Congress made them dischargeable five years after they became
due, absent undue hardship. Then in 1990, the waiting period
was extended to seven years and in 1998 to an infinite ban, in
each instance preserving the “undue hardship” exception.177 In
2005, a major overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code left in place
permanent nondischargeability, absent undue hardship, and
added private student loans, not just federally guaranteed loans
or direct federal loans, to the student loan nondischargeability

175. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (listing priority debts and not including
student loans); id. §§ 1322(a)(2), (4) (providing for full payment of priority
claims in Chapter 13 to the extent the debtor can afford from projected
disposable income).
176. See, e.g., In re Abaunza, 452 B.R. 866 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding
that an above-median-income debtor did not discriminate unfairly by paying
more to a student loan creditor than to other unsecured creditors where the
latter received their entitlements under the disposable income test of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) and the student loan was paid from discretionary income in excess of
disposable income under the means test); In re Harding, 423 B.R. 568 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2010) (disallowing the debtor to separately classify student-loan debt
in order to pay it ahead of other unsecured debt but enjoining the student loan
creditor from charging late fees, collection fees, and penalties during the
Chapter 13 case); In re Boscaccy, 442 B.R. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010)
(following Harding); In re Webb, 370 B.R. 418 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007)
(permitting separate classification and regular monthly payments to student
loan creditors during the case, even though general unsecured creditors were
being paid 1% of their claims).
177. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 174, at 180–81 (concerning dischargeability
of student loans until 1976 and then adoption of a five-year waiting period);
Pottow, supra note 13, at 248–50 (concerning imposition of a five-year waiting
period for discharge, absent undue hardship, in the Education Amendments of
1976, a provision that was moved to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8),
in 1978, effective in 1979, with extension of the waiting period from five years to
seven years in 1990 and then in 1998 to an infinite-year bar).

474

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439 (2012)

category.178 The nondischargeability of student loans after a
waiting period in the years from 1976 to 1998 depended on a
theoretical argument that former students might abuse the
discharge by going to school and then filing in bankruptcy before
getting a lucrative job, despite lack of evidence that this was
actually happening.179 In 2005, nondischargeability was extended
to private student loans, not just direct or federally guaranteed
loans, where protection of the public fisc is part of the rationale
(as with certain tax debts that are made nondischargeable).180 Of
course, nondischargeability of private student loans could be seen
as a way of promoting such credit by giving creditors who extend
it more favorable treatment in bankruptcy; an example along
these lines for another type of credit is the Chapter 13 rule
against writing down home loans to collateral value, a rule that
was originally written to promote home loans181 but during the
mortgage crisis has stood in the way of principal reduction to
reduce foreclosures and stabilize the housing market.182
Satisfying a lobbying interest is another possible explanation for
extending nondischargeability to private student loans. With
rising student loan defaults in the current prolonged high
unemployment period, however, private student loans might be
an appropriate first target for reform to provide debt relief by
making them dischargeable again as they were until 2005.
Reinstating a five-year or seven-year waiting period for a
discharge of even federal student loans would also be desirable.

178. Pottow, supra note 13, at 250.
179. Id. at 250–56.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2006).
181. See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)
At first blush it seems somewhat strange that the Bankruptcy Code
should provide less protection to an individual’s interest in retaining
possession of his or her home than of other assets. The anomaly is,
however, explained by the legislative history indicating that favorable
treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the
flow of capital into the home lending market.
182. Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons
From The Lackluster First Year of the Obama Administration’s Home Affordable
Mortgage Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 781–85 (2010) (discussing the
need for principal reduction to mitigate foreclosure losses by all concerned).
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The term “mortgage” works metaphorically as applied to
educational loans in light of the high and permanent bar to
bankruptcy discharge currently in place. To the extent of
nondischargeability of this debt in bankruptcy or otherwise,
human capital is mortgaged for life. The situation of overindebted
student-loan borrowers is actually worse than that of
homeowners who cannot afford their loans. While home loans
backed by some collateral value cannot be written down in
Chapter 13, late payments can be made up over time in a
Chapter 13 plan, something for which there is no clear and easy
provision concerning student loans.183 In addition, homeowners
who lose their homes during or after Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 do
not remain personally liable on the debt after bankruptcy. A
homeowner can give up the home, get a bankruptcy discharge,
and move on. A college education is different in that it cannot be
surrendered. There is no comparable release from personal
indebtedness on student loans after bankruptcy to that for
homes, absent an adversary proceeding that establishes undue
hardship.184
Because bankruptcy relief is difficult to come by, often debt
relief under DOE programs is more promising. The first tier of
relief for a student-loan debtor is to change repayment programs
to make the payment more affordable, whether through longer
term, graduated payments, or an income-contingent or incomebased plan.185 Loan consolidation, under a weighted average
interest rate, may also bring down the monthly total payment.186
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (2006) (prohibiting cramdown of loans
secured only by a principal residence but providing for cure of arrearages); see
also In re Labib-Kiyarash, 271 B.R. 189 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2001) (holding that 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) can be used to cure long-term student loans but only if there
is no unfair discrimination against other unsecured creditors); supra notes 175–
76 and accompanying text (concerning lack of priority status for student loans,
which makes separately classifying them and paying them ahead of unsecured
creditors of debatable legality).
184. See supra 171–74 and accompanying text.
185. See Repaying A Loan, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/repayment.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (discussing six repayment options) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
186. See Understanding Loan Consolidation: Is it the Right Move for You?,
http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/consolidation.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012)
(discussing possibility that a single payment on a consolidated loan may be
lower than the total of payments on multiples loans) (on file with the
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Deferments and forbearances are available for a variety of
circumstances, although this relief is temporary.187 Debts may be
discharged by the Secretary of Education for total and permanent
disability or death.188 If student-loan debtors simply stop
payment, they will be subject to collection,189 so it is important for
students to seek solutions other than default. DOE explains:
The common consequences of default include large fees—
collection costs that can add 25% to the outstanding loan
balance—and interest charges; struggles to rent or buy a
home, buy a car, or get a job; collection agency actions,
including lawsuits and garnishment of wages; and the loss of
tax refunds and even Social Security benefits.190

Unfortunately, DOE relief is only available on loans under
federal student loan programs. Private students loans are not
covered by DOE debt relief programs. The new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has jurisdiction over private
student loans,191 and both prevention of and remedies for
overindebtedness are needed. As of early 2012, the CFPB’s advice
to private student-loan borrowers who could not make payments
was to contact their loan servicers to see what private relief
programs may be offered.192 The agency also issued a Notice and
Request for Information Regarding Private Education Loans and
Private Education Lenders in connection with a study of private
student loans that it is required to submit to Congress by July
2012.193
Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. Get Payment Relief, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/relief.html. (last
visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
188. Cancel or Discharge a Loan, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/can
cellation.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
189. Defaulted Loans, http://www.ombudsman.ed.gov/loandefault.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2012) (concerning consequences of default) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
190. Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 11, at 34387; see also
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
191. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, Title X (2010).
192. Student Debt Repayment Assistance, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
students/repay/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
193. Request for Information Regarding Private Education Loans and
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IV. Assessing the Government’s Role
A. The Analogy to Subprime Mortgages
There are some obvious similarities between the subprime
mortgage crisis and the problem of subprime higher education. In
both cases, there has been heavy selling of the American Dream,
whether the dream is of owning a home or becoming a college
graduate.194 Furthermore, predatory lending has been a feature of
each phenomenon, involving a lack of care about or analysis of
ability to pay and benefit.195 The poor, minorities, and the
unsophisticated were targeted by both subprime complexes.196
Both phenomena have led to high debt, high default rates, and
long-term impact on borrowers’ financial well-being and access to
and cost of future credit.197
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act198 provides for regulation to make sure that
packagers of mortgages and other securitizers have “skin in the
game” for risky loans.199 There has been a similar problem of
subprime higher educational institutions having little or no stake
Private Educational Lenders, 76 Fed. Reg. 71329 (Nov. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2011-0037-0001 (seeking
comments for report on private education loans and lenders required under
section 1077 of Dodd–Frank); see also Rick Hackett, Chime In On Private
Student Loans, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU BLOG (Nov. 16
2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog.
194. See LYNCH ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
195. See id. at 1–2 (discussing problem of educational institutions that “prey
on our underserved population” and criticizing “access without success”); see
also KATHLEEN C. ENGLE & PATRICIA A MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 21–25 (2011) (concerning
predatory lending during the mortgage bubble).
196. See ENGLE & MCCOY, supra note 195, at 21; see also supra note 6.
197. See ENGLE & MCCOY, supra note 195, at 142–48 (describing how
subprime lending hit fragile neighborhoods and led to default and, as the
economic consequences unfolded, also led to rising unemployment and poverty);
see also supra Part II.E; supra notes 168, 190 and accompanying text
(concerning high rates of default on student loans to attend for-profit schools
and resulting consequences).
198. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
199. See id. § 941(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B) (2006) (calling for a
“securitizer” to retain at least 5% of the “credit risk for any asset”).
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in their students’ success. The career colleges have a nearly
perfect system of avoiding skin in the game. When students get
federal grant aid and student loans to attend college, the schools
get paid up front and do not bear the loss when former students
default later after leaving school.200 Some for-profit colleges give
or arrange for private student loans on top of federal student aid,
but this may be primarily to avoid problems with the 90% limit
on revenues from Federal HEA funds.201 To evade that limit, forprofit colleges can raise tuition, provide private student loans of
just over 10%, and not care much if they collect on the private
loans.202 Another strategy is enrolling some military and former
military personnel whose loans do not come from federal higher
education funding and thus don’t count for purposes of the 90%
limit on revenue from federal student aid funds.203
Lack of effective regulation enabled the bubbles in both
subprime mortgages and subprime higher education. The
cluelessness of credit rating agencies about the risks of subprime
mortgages204 is analogous to the lack of effective oversight of forprofit colleges by educational accrediting organizations, which the
career colleges have worked to capture and manipulate.205
Taxpayers paid for a bailout of subprime mortgage lenders and
investors,206 but in the case of subprime higher education, the
200. Federal student aid funds are disbursed while students are in school;
one method is per enrollment period, and under this method, once the student
has completed 60% of a period (such as a quarter or semester), 100% of the
funds are disbursed, even if the student later withdraws. 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.22(e)(2)(ii) (2011).
201. See supra Part II.D (discussing for-profit college reliance on federal
grant aid and student loans).
202. See supra Part II.D.
203. Hollister K. Petraeus, For Profit Colleges, Vulnerable G.I.’s, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/opinion/for-profit-collegesvulnerable-gis.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
204. See ENGLE & MCCOY, supra note 195, at 47–51 (discussing poor
judgment of rating agencies during the subprime mortgage bubble and the
incentives to rate mortgaged-back securities highly given an arranger-pays
compensation system).
205. See HARKIN, EMERGING RISK, supra note 19, at 2; see also Eisman, supra
note 6, at 29–30 (comparing higher education accrediting agencies to credit
rating agencies and discussing trend of for-profit schools acquiring schools that
are accredited to get their accreditation and also sit on the boards of agencies).
206. See ENGLE &MCCOY, supra note 195, at 111–16 (discussing passage of
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prepayment of federal grant and loan funds to the colleges makes
for a prepackaged bailout,207 leaving students and taxpayers at
risk. In this way, the federal role in subprime higher education is
even worse than in the subprime mortgage crisis because the
government is directly pumping taxpayer dollars into institutions
that it knows are generating low completion rates and high debts
for students.208
As has already been suggested,209 there is also an interesting
comparison in the treatment of unmanageable debt in bankruptcy
for mortgages as opposed to student loans, with student-loan
borrowers actually getting less relief. Home-mortgage debt is
dischargeable so that the borrower is not personally liable, but it
must generally be paid in full to retain a home.210 However, a
debtor who is willing to give up a home can discharge homemortgage debt. Student loans are nominally unsecured, but they
are effectively secured by human capital and by
nondischargeability; the law does not provide the release from
personal liability on student loans that is available with home
loans. One cannot give back a worthless education and thus walk
away from it. A debtor can be hounded to the grave for studentloan debt, no matter its ineffectiveness in improving the debtor’s
income or other prospects. Unless the debtor can prove facts to
meet the test for an undue hardship discharge, student-loan debt,
including private student-loan debt, remains nondischargeable
for life.211
While subprime higher education is worse than subprime
mortgages both in the prepackaging of the bailout and in the
long-term indenture of former students, often with no way out,
the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008 in October of that year, creating the
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the continued panic in financial
markets until large sums of TARP funds were paid to major financial
institutions to infuse them with capital). Nearly all those funds have been
repaid. See Jeff Bater and John Kell, With Fifth Third Out, Banks have Repaid
99% of TARP, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704261504576205142438418336.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
207. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part II.E.
209. Supra Part III.C.
210. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (2006).
211. See supra notes 171–74, 177–84 and accompanying text.
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there is one way in which the student loan problem is not as bad
as the mortgage crisis. It is not as big.212 While private student
loans are securitized and high risk, the risk seems to be relatively
transparent to investors.213 Losses to taxpayers on federal
student loans are substantial,214 but even if they get much worse,
as seems likely, the risk is not nearly as large as in the risk in the
mortgage bailout, although ultimately nearly all of that money
was repaid by the banks.215
B. The Questionable Policy of Relying on For-Profit Higher
Education as the Means to Expand to Universal Higher Education
In the post-war decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, it
became common to think in terms of elite, mass, and universal
higher education.216 These three categories roughly map onto
three tiers of the California higher education system—the
University of California (elite); the California State Universities
212. Total U.S. mortgage debt outstanding is about ten times total studentloan debt. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 24; Dennis Cauchon, Student
Loans Outstanding Will Exceed $1 Trillion This Year, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2011
1:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/college/story/2011-10-19/stu
dent-loan-debt/50818676/1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (stating that total
student-loan debt is expected to reach $1 trillion by the end of 2011) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). FinAid.org, which estimated the total
student debt volume slightly more conservatively as still short of $1 trillion as of
February 2012, maintains a student-loan debt clock showing the growing
volume at a site “intended for entertainment purposes only.” Student Loan Debt
Clock, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/studentloandebtclock.phtml (last
visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
213. Matt Wirz, What Hedge Funds Can Teach College Students, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702042246045
77030562170562088.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (concerning rising risk
associated with bonds backed by bundled student loans as default rates rose in
the bad economy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
214. Proposed Gainful Employment Rule Analysis, supra note 6, at 43622
(noting that the government covers the cost of defaults on federal student loans,
$9.2 billion in 2009, loans which then had a net present value of $1 billion based
on historical collections on defaulted loans).
215. See supra note 206 (concerning the $700 billion TARP bailout in
October 2008, which has nearly all been repaid).
216. Martin Trow, Reflections on the Transition from Mass to Universal
Higher Education, 99 DAEDALUS 1 (1970), available at http://www.
stor.org/pss/20023931.
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(mass); and community colleges (universal).217 Obviously, private
nonprofit universities and colleges also have a role to play in each
of these categories. The categories can also be described in terms
of percentages of the population with degrees; up to 15% (elite),
16%–50% (mass), or above 50% (universal).218
The federal government has embraced for-profit higher
education as part of a push for a higher national rate of college
graduation, currently stuck at the high end of the mass range.219
Reliance on the for-profit sector as part of the overall plan for
American higher education goes back at least to 1972, when
Congress made proprietary schools eligible to receive federal
student aid funds.220 Political explanations are apparent,
including the massive lobbying of the for-profit industry221 and
ideological commitment to “private” solutions, even if heavily
dependent on federal government funding.222 Whether there are
sound public policy justifications for reliance on for-profit
education is a much harder question to answer. A recent study of
trends in college spending expressed skepticism that expansion of
the private sector, including nonprofit and for-profit colleges, will
go far enough: “Most would say not: to make the huge increases
in access and degree production that are needed in the future, we
need to rekindle public willingness to invest in higher education,

217. Chris Armbruster, On Cost-Sharing, Tuition Fees and Income
Contingent Loans for Universal Higher Education: A New Contract Between
University, Student and State? 6 POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 3, (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract+910001.
218. Id. at 7.
219. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. In 2007, 40.4% of the U.S.
population aged 25–34 had college degrees, associate and higher, making the
United States tenth among the OECD countries. Patrick J. Kelly, Closing the
College Attainment Gap Between the U.S. and Most Educated Countries, and
Contributions to be Made by the States, Nat’l Ctr. for Higher Educ. (Apr. 2010),
available at http://www.nchems.org/pubs/docs/Closing%20the%20U%20S%20%
20Degree%20Gap%20NCHEMS%20Final.pdf. Canada, Korea, and Japan had
the top three rates in the same 25–34 population, with college degree rates of
55.8%, 55.5%, and 53.7%, respectively. Id. The attainment level in the United
States has largely leveled off, with persons 35–44 in 2007 showing a slightly
higher level of college degree attainment, 42.2%. Id.
220. See supra note 113.
221. See supra note 108.
222. See supra Part II.D.
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even as we increase cost effectiveness and reduce the trend
toward higher tuitions.”223
A primary public policy reason for reliance on for-profit
schools could be a hope of reducing the cost of production, in part
by making students largely pay their own way with student
loans. So a key question, for which there seems to be insufficient
data due to lack of information about the for-profit sector’s
finances, is whether for-profit schools really produce educated
citizens with degrees at lower cost than alternatives, taking into
account both the low graduation rates of for-profits, federal grant
and loan aid subsidies to them, and default rates of their former
students. Three-quarters of American higher education students
go to public institutions.224 All public institutions are subsidized,
but the subsidies have been declining as state and local
governments faced budget crunches, even as more students
attended these schools.225 In 2009, community colleges educated
6.5 million students, the largest single sector of higher education
with more than a third of students nationwide,226 and the cost of
the education on average was about $10,000 per FTE student, no
more than the average amount spent on elementary and
secondary education.227 As community colleges added students,
they also lost public subsidies and did not raise tuition as much
as the cuts, resulting in cost-cutting affecting the education
itself.228 In addition, more than another third of higher education
223. DONNA M. DESROCHERS & JANE V. WELLMAN, TRENDS IN COLLEGE
SPENDING 1999–2009: WHERE DOES THE MONEY COME FROM? WHERE DOES IT GO?
WHAT DOES IT BUY? 45 (2011), available at http://www.deltacostproject.org/
resources/pdf/Trends2011_Final_090711.pdf; see also Cellini and Goldin, supra
note 1 (raising a challenge to the for-profit sector based on the lower tuition at
for-profit schools that do not receive federal student aid; however their data are
perhaps of limited relevance to a goal of universal higher education in that the
for-profit schools they studied that did not participate in federal student aid
programs were typically non-degree-granting vocational programs).
224. Id. at 11 fig.2 (showing total public enrollment of nearly 77% of
undergraduates in 2009).
225. Id. at 32–33 figs.13 & 14.
226. Id. at 10 fig.1.
227. Id. at 7; see also Extracts on Key Issue Areas From “Trends in College
Spending, 1999–2009” at 1 (2011) [hereinafter Extracts], http://www.delta
costproject.org/resources/pdf/trendsissuehighlights.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
228. Extracts, supra note 227, at 3.
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is provided by public institutions with programs through the
doctoral or masters’ level.229 These schools lost even more subsidy
and adjusted by raising tuition but managed to maintain
expenditures on education by cutting elsewhere in their
budgets.230
Taking on a mortgage for a university education has become
a common feature of late adolescent life in America, and for-profit
college graduates have the highest debt.231 In 2010, total studentloan debt volume rose above that of credit card debt for the first
time, as a result of increases in the former and decline in the
latter in the wake of credit constriction brought on by the Great
Recession.232 College freshmen reported record levels of stress as
they worried about their career prospects in relation to the debt
they were incurring.233 The implications for household finance of
entering adult life with an educational mortgage are profound,
even for those who do not obviously fail. Among borrowers for
postsecondary education, 48% say having to repay student loans
makes it harder to pay bills and make ends meet and 25% say it
is harder to buy a home.234 Predictably, these effects are worse for
students with higher debts and lower success rates in completing
programs, as is the case for those who attend for-profit schools.235
Under a principle of worst things first, it makes sense to get
229. DESROCHERS & WELLMAN, supra note 223, at 7 (noting that public fouryear institutions protected educational spending even as revenues declined and
that tuition rose to replace lost revenues from other sources).
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
232. See Mary Pilon, Student-Loan Debt Surpasses Credit Cards, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 9, 2010 1:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/08/09/studentloan-debt-surpasses-credit-cards/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting that in
2010 there was $826.5 billion in credit-card debt outstanding and $829.79
billion in student loans) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1188: Credit Card-Holders, Number, Spending,
and Debt (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s
1188.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (showing total credit card debt outstanding
of $886 billion in 2009 and $838 billion projected for 2012). Total student-loan
debt was expected to exceed $1 trillion in 2011 or soon after. See supra note 212.
233. HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE FRESHMAN SURVEY:
NATIONAL NORMS FALL 2010 (Jan. 2011) available at http://www.heri.ucla.edu/
PDFs/pubs/briefs/HERI_ResearchBrief_Norms2010.pdf
234. See Pew Research Center, supra note 8.
235. See supra Part II.E.
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tougher on for-profit colleges, shutting down access to federal
student aid funds for those with the lowest repayment rates and
highest debt-to-income ratios to minimize these schools’ negative
effects.
V. Conclusion
The growth of predatory for-profit higher education has been
dramatically fueled in the last decade by an infusion of federal
dollars in the form of federal grant aid and student loans. The
for-profit sector is offering subprime higher education
characterized by high price and high risk of producing only
overindebtedness. The idea of a subprime higher education sector
captures well many of its features as well as the similarities to
subprime mortgages, in terms of cost, risk, value, and the
population targeted by marketing. Looking back on the housing
bubble, we can see that the push for expanded homeownership
went too far. Many of those who bought homes with subprime
mortgages became owners in name only; in reality, they had no
equity and effectively ended up paying very high rent or
defaulting and taking a blow to their credit scores. It would have
been better if regulation had prevented the bubble. A very similar
argument can be made about subprime higher education. Just as
some of the new homeowners would have been better off
remaining renters, some people would be better off not going to
for-profit colleges. Predatory lending will not get us to universal
college education. The federal funds going to this sector would be
best used at the highest performing for-profit schools or otherwise
at community colleges or other public institutions. Shutting down
more predatory for-profit colleges is a sound strategy to contain
the damage to students and the waste of federal resources, but
the political challenge of doing so should not be underestimated.
In this difficult context, DOE’s first step with the overly cautious
Gainful Employment Rule is a small victory.

